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FEDERAL HOUSING LOANS: IS STATE MORTGAGE
LAW PREEMPTED?
INTRODUCTION
In the field of real property secured transactions, there
exists a pervasive scheme of statutory and judicial protections
for debtors.' Although the individual rules vary from state to
state, most were enacted to prevent creditor overreaching.2
Under federal law, debtors may lose their state law protections
if they have any direct connection with the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), the Small Business Administration
(SBA), or the Veterans Administration (VA). This results from
the federal agency's involvement in transactions through a di-
rect loan, a full or partial guarantee of a private loan, or a
partial guarantee as a substitute for an initial down payment.
The agency may later be in federal court litigating the transac-
tion by foreclosing on the mortgage and seeking a judgment for
the deficiency.3 This situation presents a federal-state choice of
law question.
In diversity cases, state law applies.4 Where a federal stat-
ute is clearly on point, federal law applies." Generally, real
property loan transactions are not covered by a federal statute
and are not before the court on diversity. Indeed, SBA, FHA,
and VA loans and loan guarantees do not fit the definitions of
diversity or federal question jurisdiction. No federal question
1 1979 by Douglas Scott Maynard.
1. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West 1976); id. § 726 (West Supp.
1979) (fair value limitations); id. §§ 580b, 580d (West 1976) (anti-deficiency provi-
sions); id. § 725a (West 1955) (statutory right of redemption); id. § 564 (West 1954)
(appointment of receiver pending foreclosure); id. §§ 702, 703 (West Supp. 1979)
(determination of redemption price).
2. See, e.g., Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 873 (1963), where the purposes behind CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 580b are ex-
plained. Cf. United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970), where the court expressed doubts that statutory redemp-
tion really serves the legislative purpose.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976) confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts where
a federal agency is a plaintiff. The government, as a plaintiff, will choose a federal
court because it is the more responsive forum. For an example of a decision adverse to
the government in a state court, see State ex rel. Lonctot v. Sparkman & McLean Co.,
16 Wash. App. 402, 556 P.2d 946 (1976), where the government as appellant was
apparently the victim of local debtor sentiment.
4. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), held that the federal courts
must apply the law of the states in which they sit. The holding was limited to cases
before the courts solely on the basis of diversity. The federal courts had previously
applied "general federal common law" to these cases.
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause).
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is presented because resolution of questions involving real
property does not require interpretation of the Constitution or
an act of Congress. Where a federal agency is a party to a real
property loan transaction, the federal district courts have juris-
diction because the United States is the plaintiff.
Choice of federal or state law is ill-defined where jurisdic-
tion is not founded on federal question or diversity. Where
jurisdiction exists solely because the United States is a party,
choice of law is determined on a case-by-case basis.7
This comment will examine this gray area and attempt to
delineate appropriate standards to govern the choice of law
issue where a federal agency is a party to a real property loan
transaction. The author concludes that many courts have not
applied the traditional preemption balancing test but instead
have applied federal law without properly considering the is-
sues in the context of real property loan transactions, thereby
depriving a debtor of all state law protections.
EXISTING CHOICE OF LAW RULES
Preemption
Although federal preemption traditionally involves a bal-
ancing of federal and state policies,' the analysis in real prop-
erty cases has been obscured. State debtor protections have
been preempted in an overwhelming majority of real property
loan transaction cases with only conclusory analysis of state
and federal policies. Nevertheless, since state law has been the
rule of decision on occasion, it is necessary to consider the
arguments that have successfully brought about application of
state law.
Two theories have been suggested to define the status of
state law. The first theory is that state law should apply of its
own force where consistent with federal programs.' This view
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976).
7. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). Speaking
directly to this problem, the Supreme Court has said: "In our choice of the applicable
federal rule we have occasionally selected state law." Id. at 367.
8. Id.
9. This view is based upon the argument that a mere jurisdictional grant of
power to adjudicate does not necessarily carry with it a federal substantive rule. The
argument is based on an extension of the Erie doctrine.
To be sure, Erie would not be conclusive on that question, for the func-
tions of the diversity-of-citizenship and United States-a-party jurisdic-
tional grants are distinguishable, and there are situations where power to
declare governing law must be implied from a grant of jurisdiction.
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has not been adopted by any court, but several have declined
to decide the issue.' 0 The second theory is that state law may
be incorporated as the federal rule if, in substance, it would
promote the objectives of the federal program." It is the second
theory that has found acceptance in some courts. 2
Where state law hinders rather than promotes the objec-
tives of the federal program, a federal common law rule may
be formulated-the rationale being that Congress did not in-
tend for state law to defeat the purposes of federal legislation.
3
Obviously, this federal common law rule may replace state
debtor protections with protection of the federal investment.
These general preemption principles combined with the
federal system of government can cause a variety of rules to be
applied. Because federal courts can only incorporate state rules
consistent with the federal program, one state's law may be
Nevertheless, Erie would tend to cast doubt on implication of law-
making power simply from the grant of jurisdiction over suits brought by
the United States, if only because (1) it establishes that jurisdictional
grants do not necessarily entail such a power; and (2) it expresses a strong
policy against differences in governing law being based on choice of tri-
bunal ....
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice
of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rv. 797, 799 n.10 (1957).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 357 (1966).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); United States v.
MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975); Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.
1960); State ex rel. Lonctot v. Sparkman & McLean Co., 16 Wash. App. 402, 556 P.2d
946 (1976). Congressional intent is important in any consideration of whether state law
shall be adopted as the federal rule. For instance, Congress intended the Small Busi-
ness Administration to "aid, counsel, assist and protect ...the interests of small
business concerns . . . . 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976). This shows congressional concern
for private interests. The policy to protect private interests may be greater than other
federal policies, such as collection of the full amount of the debt. If the state rules do
not conflict with federal policy, state law should apply. See Bumb v. United States,
276 F.2d at 736-37. The applicable federal policy varies with the agency involved in
the transaction. See United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d at 42 (federal policy con-
cerning SBA loans deemed consistent with and limited by state statutory redemption
rights). MacKenzie distinguished United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d
358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970), where an almost identical state statute
was held inapplicable to the Federal Housing Administration on the basis of the
difference in congressional purposes of the agencies. The enabling legislation will give
the best insight into the general federal policy.
12. Some courts have taken the position that the applicable law is federal by
virtue of the fact that a federal agency is a party to the contract and the suit. Most of
the courts which rely on this argument virtually assume their conclusions-that state
law cannot apply of its own force. The result of this view is that state law will not
govern the rights of the parties unless the federal courts adopt state law as the federal
rule.
13. United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268
F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
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adopted while a neighboring state's law may not be adopted.
Where state law is incorporated as the federal rule, a different
rule would be used in each state. In those states where the law
is inconsistent with federal policy, the federal courts would
fashion a federal rule to be applied only in those states. Thus,
"uniformity" is actually nonexistent, and it is important to
review the approach used in the Ninth Circuit where Califor-
nia's debtor protection statutes face analysis against the objec-
tives of Congress in enacting federal loan programs.
Ninth Circuit Tests
The courts in the Ninth Circuit consider three initial fac-
tors to categorize a transaction and determine whether state
law will be incorporated as the federal rule: 1) Is there a federal
regulation on point? 2) Is there an individually negotiated
contract? 3) Is there a contractual provision that state law shall
apply?"
Federal Regulation on Point. If a federal regulation is on
point, state law covering the same issue and establishing a
different rule will be preempted. 5 Regulations adopted pur-
suant to congressional mandate create the applicable federal
law and release the courts from a formulation of a federal com-
mon law rule.
In response to unfavorable court decisions, some agencies
have issued regulations which vaguely assert that federal law
applies. One such regulation purportedly waives any local
immunity in favor of federal law." The effect of such regula-
14. United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572, 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1977).
15. Id.
16. 13 C.F.R. § 101.1(d) (1978). This regulation was adopted in response to
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). In Yazel, the Small Business Administra-
tion had negotiated a contract to which the Court applied state law. The government
had contracted with reference to, and had attempted to waive, the state law defense
of coverture. When the desired result did not materialize, the SBA decided to remove
the problem of compliance with state law. A regulation that covers all contracts is a
more efficient means than individually contracting away state-created rights. This
regulation implicitly recognizes that state law may apply of its own force. It is very
different from the comprehensive scheme adopted by the Veterans Administration in
that it is simply an asserted waiver of local rights. Since the regulation states that local
immunity is waived, it must mean only that the state protections are waived if they
are not incorporated as part of federal law. Presumably, the SBA could not force the
debtor to waive federal law, as this would give the SBA an unfair advantage. The only
possible application is as a waiver of state law applying of its own force. The implica-
tion is that the regulation will have no effect where state law is incorporated as the
federal rule. This is because the state protection is federal law, and by the terms of
the regulation, federal law applies.
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tions has yet to be determined. Assuming the particular agency
has congressional authorization, the courts usually defer to the
regulations and give them the force and effect of law. Congress
typically delegates its law-making authority to federal agen-
cies, with the result that the FHA, the SBA, and the VA are
all authorized to create regulations on their own behalf. 7 In all
cases where a regulation does not resolve the specific issue of
the case, other factors must be considered before the choice of
law issue is resolved.
Individually Negotiated Contract. If there is an individu-
ally negotiated contract, further consideration of state law will
be required. Inquiry will focus on the strength of the state
interest, resulting in application of the state rule if a particu-
larly strong local interest is present. The individually negoti-
ated contract may tip the scales in favor of application of state
debtor protections.
The first case involving such a contract, United States v.
Yazell, 1 was decided by the Supreme Court in 1966. In Yazell,
the Small Business Administration made a disaster loan to a
husband and wife. After default, the SBA tried to collect
against the wife, who interposed the Texas state law defense of
coverture. Because the original contract had been
"individually tailored," the Supreme Court concluded that
peculiarly local interests, such as the defense of coverture,
could not be overridden." The contract was specifically
adapted to state law and was not a general form in use through-
out the country. These distinctions were important in deter-
mining that an individually negotiated contract existed.
Also important in the context of the individually negoti-
ated contract was the strength of the particular state interest
17. 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(6) (1976) (Small Business Administration); 12 U.S.C. §
1749a(c)(1) (1976) (Federal Housing Administration); 38 U.S.C. § 1819(h) (1976) (Vet-
erans Administration).
18. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
19. "Again, it must be emphasized that this was a custom-made, hand-tailored,
specifically negotiated transaction. It Was not a nationwide act of the Federal Govern-
ment, emanating in a single form from a single source." Id. at 347-48.
Clearly, in the case of these SBA loans there is no 'federal interest'
which justifies invading the peculiarly local jurisdiction of these states,
in disregard of their laws.
The decisions of this Court do not compel or embrace the result
sought by the Government. None of the cases in which this Court has
devised and applied a federal principle of law superseding state law in-
volved an issue arising from an individually negotiated contract.
Id. at 353.
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being asserted. In Yazell, the state interest in family law out-
weighed the federal interest of collection of the federal debt.
Family and property arrangements are peculiarly local inter-
ests which may not be overridden simply because the govern-
ment is a party. 0
Where an individually negotiated contract has been used,
congressional intent seems to be less relevant. The courts pur-
port to look only to the contract itself in determining the intent
of the parties. This may be contrasted with the case where the
individually negotiated contract is not a factor; the courts vir-
tually ignore the contractual intent of the actual parties and
look to the overall congressional intent and purposes behind
the transactions.2'
The individually negotiated contract is similar in many
respects to contractual choice of law provisions. Specific refer-
ence to state law is not a necessary condition of the individually
negotiated contract.22 However, in Yazell, it was important
that the contract, though apparently not specifically stating
that state law was to apply, made reference to one state statute
and partially complied with the provisions of the statute at
issue. The result of finding an individually negotiated contract
is a choice of law term implied from agency conduct where
strong state interests are present. Since the courts have implied
such provisions, effect should also be given to explicit terms
providing for the application of state law.
Contractual Provision that State Law Should Apply. If a
contractual choice of law provision is present, it will be fol-
lowed to the extent that it is reasonable. A contractual provi-
sion was held to be determinative in United States v. Stewart, 2 3
involving a VA loan. Stewart was an action for a deficiency
after a non-judicial sale. California statutes24 prohibit a defi-
ciency after a non-judicial sale. The deed of trust contained a
provision providing: "This Deed shall be construed according
to the laws of the State of California."" This contractual provi-
sion was given effect, and the court applied state law. If the
provision had been absent, the VA's comprehensive regulations
20. 382 U.S. at 353.
21. See id. at 354.
22. United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977).
23. 523 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1975).
24. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 580b, 580d (West 1976). In this situation, CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 580a would not bar a deficiency or even limit it in light of CAL. CIv. Poc.
CODE § 580d. Apparently, CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 580d was overlooked.
25. 523 F.2d at 1072.
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would have been controlling."6
Apparently the court felt that the provision in the contract
specifically providing for application of state law was a waiver
by the VA of its own regulations. By insisting on a provision
that state law shall govern the rights of the parties, a debtor
can retain his state-created rights. However, since FHA and
VA loans are usually guarantees utilizing nationally adopted
form contracts rather than individually tailored direct loan
contracts, choice of law provisions may be beyond the reach of
negotiation by individual debtors.
After initial categorization of the transaction under the
factors discussed above, the interrelationship of federal and
state interests must be considered. In many cases where an
individually negotiated contract or a choice of law provision
was not present, the Ninth Circuit has nullified state debtor
protections and fashioned a federal common law rule based on
the national interests of uniformity and the federal fisc.
The Talismans: Uniformity and the Federal Fisc
In the absence of an individually negotiated contract or a
specific choice of law provision in the contract, federal law has
almost universally become the rule of decision. Federal law is
applied as a consequence of the "need" for uniformity and
protection of the federal fisc. Both the uniformity and federal
fisc arguments have been taken from other areas of preemption
law27 and have been applied without any real consideration of
their meaning in real property loan transactions.
Uniformity. The Ninth Circuit uniformity argument fo-
cuses on the burden that a different rule in each state would
impose on the federal agencies. Without uniform rules, addi-
tional expenses would be incurred in the nature of attorneys'
26. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961). Shimer was held to be
controlling in a similar case, United States v. Rossi, 342 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1965). In
Stewart, the contract had two provisions: one provided that federal law was to govern
the rights of the parties, and the other provided that state law was to apply. The
provision for federal law was crossed out by the parties at the time of negotiating the
contract, thus evidencing a conscious choice on the part of the SBA that state law
should apply.
27. The uniformity argument came from Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363 (1943), a case involving the federal remedy for a government-issued check.
The federal fisc argument apparently came from United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301 (1947), where the U.S. Army sought to recover in tort for interference with
the government-soldier relationship arising out of an automobile accident. Although
the Court held that federal rather than state law governed, it ruled that the United
States was not entitled to recover in the absence of congressional legislation.
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SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
fees, separate contract forms for each state, and losses caused
by state restrictions on creditor actions and recovery.
Drawing on language from Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States,"5 the Ninth Circuit has transplanted the uniformity
argument from commercial paper into real property loan
transctions.9 In Clearfield Trust, the United States issued a
check that was fraudulently endorsed. The United States, as
drawee, sought to recover from Clearfield Trust Company in an
action based on an express guarantee of prior endorsements.
Clearfield Trust Company defended on the grounds that unrea-
sonable delay in giving notice of the forgery barred recovery
under Pennsylvania law. The Supreme Court held that a uni-
form rule was needed in commercial paper transactions where
the United States would otherwise be subject to the vagaries
of the laws of the several states. The Court went on to say that
under the uniform federal rule, recovery would be denied only
where the drawee's delay caused damage.
Many Ninth Circuit cases have considered the uniformity
argument to be conclusive in real property loan transactions
after showing that application of state law would result in a
different rule in each state.30 The ingredient missing in the
Ninth Circuit's uniformity analysis is the weighing of federal
and state interests-an ingredient crucial to the Supreme
Court's analysis in Clearfield Trust. If the Ninth Circuit had
analyzed the federal and state interests, a federal common law
rule might nevertheless be required in many state debtor pro-
tection cases because of a large burden placed on a federal
agency where state law is imposed. However, there is no focus
on such a balancing.
The Federal Fisc. Financial loss is the greatest concern
expressed by the Ninth Circuit as a reason for rejecting state
law. Potential bankruptcy of the federal programs is possible
where state law imposes severe restrictions.
In the landmark case of United States v. View Crest Apart-
28. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
29. See United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 364 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments,
Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); Clark Investment Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 7
(9th Cir. 1966); United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959). Accord, United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1971) (chattel mortgage).
31. 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
[Vol. 19
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ments, Inc.,3" the Ninth Circuit established a general rule
which has been applied almost mechanically by the federal
courts for nearly two decades.3" In that case, the Federal Hous-
ing Insurance Authority applied for appointment of a receiver
pending foreclosure. Washington state law did not allow ap-
pointment of a receiver under the circumstances, but the con-
tract had a provision allowing a receiver. The court held that
"the federal policy to protect the treasury and to promote the
security of federal investment"33 required a federal rule allow-
ing the action. The rule promoted the purpose of the federal
program which was "to facilitate the building of homes by the
use of federal credit."'" View Crest stands for the proposition
that where, as in appointment of receivers, state law imposes
a large financial burden on the government, a federal common
law rule will be adopted.
Although the court in View Crest properly chose federal
common law as the rule of decision, the case has often been
cited too broadly 5 as a justification for rejection of state law
in order to protect the federal fisc. Although occasionally indi-
cating that state law may never apply if the result would im-
pinge on the federal fisc,36 the Ninth Circuit has not really
adopted such a simplistic approach."
Protection of federal revenues is an implied congressional
policy that can outweigh any state interest. Congress, when
it creates a federal agency, does not intend to deplete the treas-
ury and the funding of the program. Therefore, Congress must
have intended a rule that would protect the government's
fiscal interest. This policy is often inconsistent with state
debtor protections."
32. See, e.g., United States v. Allgeyer, 466 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1972); Branden
v. Driver, 441 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc.,
425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); Clark Investment Co. v.
United States, 364 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966); Herlong-Sierra Homes v. United States, 358
F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Rossi, 342 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Queens Court Apartments, Inc., 296 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1961).
33. United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 383 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Allgeyer, 466 F.2d 1195, 1196 (9th Cir. 1972).
36. Id.
37. See United States v. Stewart, 523 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975); Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th
Cir. 1960).
38. Anti-deficiency statutes, such as CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976),
are the best examples. Such statutes deny recovery to the creditor without respect to
the degree of debtor culpability.
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The use of uniformity and protection of the federal fisc as
talismanic reasons for rejecting state law usually carry the day.
Only one exception has surfaced and successfully overcome
these overwhelming federal interests: state law may limit the
enforcement of a federal remedy.
An Exception: Balancing In Disguise
A distinction has been drawn between establishment of
the validity of the transaction and the government's remedy to
enforce the contract." It is almost universally accepted that the
initial validity of the transaction must be tested under state
law." Problems associated with establishing a different federal
rule require this result. The state interest in maintaining one
set of records to assure certainty of title to land outweighs the
federal interest in having a uniform rule. There is little finan-
cial burden on the federal government in complying with state
procedures for assuring good title. However, the situation is
different when government remedies are involved.4 The federal
interest outweighs the state interest where application of state
remedies may have an adverse financial impact on the federal
treasury. Thus, while the validity of the transaction is deter-
mined by state law, the remedy is determined by federal law.
While the existence of a remedy will usually be federal, the
methods of enforcing that remedy may be limited by incorpora-
tion of the state rule. 2 Minor state law limitations on federal
recovery impose a small burden on the government while ad-
vancing important state policies. A balancing of federal and
state interests produced this result in two recent Ninth Circuit
decisions involving SBA loans.
In United States v. MacKenzie,'3 an SBA loan had been
foreclosed. The SBA brought suit to recover a deficiency judg-
ment against the debtor. The court held that a Nevada fair
39. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. at 356; Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d
at 737; United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d at 383.
40. United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320 (1876); United States v. Stadium
Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d at 363-64; Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d at 736. But cf
United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct.
77 (1978) (sufficiency of U.C.C. financing statement governed by federal law).
41. Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. View
Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884
(1959).
42. United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d at 42; Bumb v. United States, 276
F.2d at 738; State ex ret. Lonctot v. Sparkman & McLean Co., 16 Wash. App. 402,
556 P.2d 946 (1976).
43. 510 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975).
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value limitation" applied. As a result, the SBA was required
to comply with a judicial procedure in which the court deter-
mined the fair market value of the property foreclosed upon.'
5
Application of the statute limited the SBA to the difference
between the judicially established fair market value and the
amount of the debt. The purpose of the fair value statute was
to prevent creditors from bidding less than the fair value at
foreclosure sales and later obtaining an excessive deficiency
judgment. Clearly the rule did not conflict with the federal
purpose of collecting the federal debt because the statute only
had an economic effect where the government attempted to
effect a "double recovery."'" Restricting the government to a
deficiency not exceeding the difference between the amount of
the debt and the value of the security deprived the government
of nothing to which it was entitled and was the only equitable
result.
In the companion case, United States v. Engine Service,"
the court adopted Arizona statutory redemption as the federal
rule. The SBA analogized to a previous Ninth Circuit case
involving the FHA18 where a similar state period of statutory
redemption was denied a debtor. In distinguishing this pre-
vious case, the court focused on the different purposes of the
FHA and SBA. The congressional purpose in establishing the
SBA program was to "aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar
as is possible, the interests of small business concerns in order
to preserve free competitive enterprise . . . and to maintain
and strengthen the over-all economy of the nation."'" The
thrust of SBA loans is to aid and protect private interests. On
the other hand, the underlying purpose of FHA loans is "to
assist in relieving the acute shorfage of housing . . . and to
increase the supply of housing accommodations available to
veterans of World War II at prices within their reasonable abil-
ity to pay . . ,,.o FHA loan guarantees exist to provide hous-
44. NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 1-1.457, 1-1.459, 40.455 (1973).
45. Id. § 40.457.
46. "Devices to assure that fair market prices are received at foreclosure sales
redound to its benefit. Depriving the Government of potential 'double recoveries' cre-
ated by artificially large deficiencies that it has caused takes away nothing to which
it is entitled." United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d at 42.
47. 510 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975).
48. United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976) (cited in United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d at
41).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1738(a) (1976).
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ing, thus showing a greater congressional interest in building
homes than in aiding debtors. In MacKenzie, this different
focus was crucial in the balancing of federal and state interests.
MacKenzie was limited and further explained in a recent
case" as applying only to state laws limiting the method of
enforcing the federal remedy, not to laws prohibiting the rem-
edy itself. Since SBA contracts are generally individually tai-
lored, this exception may, therefore, be limited to the individu-
ally negotiated contract.
Thus, although state law will govern the initial validity of
the transaction, the existence of a federal remedy cannot be
impaired by state law. Federal recovery after foreclosure may
be limited by state procedures if no major financial burden will
be imposed on the government. Perhaps this represents a re-
turn to balancing as proposed by the Supreme Court in
Clearfield Trust. 52 It is this balancing which should be the basis
of a more cogent choice of law analysis in real property loan
transactions. In this way, those state laws that do not impinge
on federal policy may be adopted and applied to protect debt-
ors.
A Critique
Critical examination has revealed that the courts have not
properly weighed the interests of federal and state law. Federal
law will generally be applied, and the analysis has on occasion
been far too simplistic. Policy arguments have led the courts
to application of federal law by reliance on the talismanic slo-
gans of uniformity of result and protection of the federal fisc.
These policies have been given disproportionate emphasis in
light of their importance in real property transactions, and the
weight given to them should be modified accordingly.
In Clearfield Trust, uniformity weighed heavily in the
analysis and required a federal rule.5 3 However, it is important
to recognize the balancing of federal and state interests that
was present in the analysis. Uniformity was not applied as a
litmus test but rather, was applied when considered within the
particular circumstances of the case.
Clearfield Trust involved the federal remedy for forged
checks. Since commercial paper is commonly involved in
multi-state transactions, applicable state law would be diffi-
51. United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977).




cult to ascertain. The Court was concerned with the
"exceptional uncertainty" resulting from the fortuitous migra-
tion from state to state of a particular check, making it impos-
sible to determine which states would be involved and which
state's law should prevail." In this situation, the state's inter-
est was relatively minor. Recovery would have been barred
under state law because of an unreasonable delay in notifying
Clearfield Trust Company of its liability. The state interest in
applying its law was outweighed by a strong federal interest in
preventing the uncertainty inherent in multi-state transac-
tions. In the absence of multi-state contacts, the state rule
might have been adopted as federal law. 5
Although not involving real property transactions,
Clearfield Trust is significant because its uniformity analysis
has become the basis for the extension of the preemption doc-
trine to that area.5" If its balancing analysis were applied in-
stead to the specific facts of real property loans, major distinc-
tions would cause uniformity to have less importance.
One major distinction between the Clearfield Trust facts
and real property secured transactions is that in the latter,
even assuming that state law did apply, there is no uncertainty
as to which state's law would be relevant. A multi-state real
property secured transaction is not frequently encountered. In
addition, real property transactions are less transitory than
commercial paper transactions. In real property contracts,
there is always an underlying note, mortgage, or other lien and
usually a guarantee. The parties to the transaction contract
within the same state. Because land is involved, the state law
which would be incorporated is nearly always that of the situs
of the property. Since multi-state contacts and "exceptional
uncertainty" are not present in real property loan transactions,
54. [Rleasons which may make state law at times the appropriate
federal rule are singularly inappropriate here. The issuance of commer-
cial paper by the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that
paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states.
The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws rules of the
forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United States to excep-
tional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by making
identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several
states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.
Id.
55. Id.
56. "As the Supreme Court of the United States stated in Clearfield Trust,
supra, 'in our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state
law.' But not when 'the desirability of a uniform federal rule is plain."' United States
v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d at 382.
19791
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
uniformity should not be a major factor in balancing the rela-
tive interests of federal and state law. 57
Application of the different state laws would not be an
overwhelming burden. Federal agencies have legal counsel
available in each state and are well aware of state law."8 Where
the validity of instruments is concerned, federal agencies must
comply with state law in any case. The transaction has such
an overwhelming relationship to one state, that the need for
uniformity, on balance, is not of great significance.
The advantages of consistency within the state easily out-
weigh the minimal burden to the federal government where
minor state limitations are imposed. The fair value limita-
tions,5 9 for example, though different in each state, have a com-
mon purpose-to insure a fair price for the property at a fore-
closure sale. Application of fair value limitations will result in
consistency within the state, without any great burden on the
agency. The typical statute denies recovery of a deficiency to
the extent it has been the result of an artificially low sale price
at foreclosure. There is no precarious uncertainty and no ele-
ment of unfair surprise since conformance with the statute does
not deny recovery except to the extent that recovery is inequit-
able. 0 Proper balancing of federal and state interests should
result in incorporation of state fair value limitations.
Several state debtor protections may be strong enough as
state interests to outweigh a weak federal interest if a balancing
approach is used. State laws governing execution, deficiency
after trustee's sale, and multiplicity of actions may be eligible
for incorporation as the federal rule.
One federal remedy that has been modified by state law
is execution upon a judgment. The federal government is sub-
ject to state exemptions, including homestead provisions, when
collecting a judgment."' This includes execution upon a defi-
57. The Supreme Court in Clearfield Trust was concerned with arbitrary results
in identical transactions. When the Court complained of "the vagaries of the laws of
the several states," it was because the transaction touched several states, and choice
of law from among those states would create an arbitrary result. This factor is not
present in federal loans and loan guarantees on real property. 318 U.S. at 367.
58. Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d at 738 (SBA enforcement of chattel mort-
gage).
59. California has two such statutes. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp.
1979) (judicial foreclosure); id. § 580a (West 1976) (extra-judicial foreclosure).
60. See Madison Properties, Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir.
1967) (district court recognized that it was customary to allow statutory redemption);
United States v. West Willow Apartments, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 755, 758 (E.D. Mich.
1965) (statutory redemption) (but federal, not state law applies).
61. FED. R. Crv. P. 69 provides in part:
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ciency judgment obtained in a real property foreclosure. Ex-
emption from execution is expressly governed by statute,"2 so
that consideration of the competing interests is academic.
Another potential area for modification of the federal rem-
edy is the provision prohibiting a deficiency after a trustee's
sale under a deed of trust. 3 There are two methods of foreclo-
sure under a trust deed.6 4 Judicial foreclosure requires a hearing
where evidence must be presented on the fair market value of
the property before a deficiency may be assessed. In order to
protect the debtor further, a period of redemption is allowed.
Extra-judicial foreclosure through trustee's sale frees the credi-
tor from the burdens of court foreclosure (such as time, ex-
pense, and attorneys fees), allows a large amount of freedom
in conducting the sale, and gives clear title. However, it prohib-
its any deficiency. The existence of extra-judicial foreclosure
presents a trade-off between the traditional right of statutory
redemption and a recovery limited to the value of the original
security. If the creditor desires a deficiency, he must judicially
foreclose, and the debtor has the protection of redemption.
This restriction on the use of trust deeds could be considered a
minor limitation of the remedy and may be incorporated as the
federal rule.
Similarly, the California one-form-of-action rule65 may be
a valid limitation of the federal remedy. This rule prohibits a
multiplicity of actions. An action against one portion of the
security without including the entire security is a waiver of the
remainder. Compliance by the federal government imposes a
small burden because the only requirement of the statute is
foreclosure on all security at the same time. If the government
Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ
of execution . . . [and] execution shall be in accordance with the prac-
tice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held . . .
except that any statute of the United States governs to the extent that it
is applicable.
62. Id.
63. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976) prohibits such a deficiency in
California.
64. For a discussion of the legislative purpose of CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580d,
see J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS 248-50 (1970).
65. CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1979) provides a sanction effect that
may be raised by the debtor where not all of the security for a loan has been foreclosed
upon at the same time. The purpose is to prevent a multiplicity of actions by requiring
the creditor to foreclose on all the security at one time. If a creditor fails to comply,
he may lose the rest of his security. In the alternative, the debtor may require the
creditor to include all security in the foreclosure action before obtaining a deficiency.
For a discussion of CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726, see J. HETLAND, supra note 64, at 236-
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complies with the statute, no additional expenses would ensue.
Since the federal fiscal interest is negligible, the state interest
should prevail.
The basic suggestion of this comment is that a balancing
of federal and state interests is the best solution to the incon-
gruities characteristic to choice of law in real property secured
transactions. The courts have found uniformity conclusive of
choice of law, even though multi-state contacts were not pres-
ent. Because the force of the uniformity argument is lost where
no multi-state contacts exist, uniformity should constitute no
more than one factor to be balanced in the analysis. Protection
of the federal fisc, although a predominate federal interest,
should not be determinative where only a minor infringement
on the federal purse would occur. State law should be adopted
as the federal rule where the federal fiscal interest is not signifi-
cantly impaired.
CONCLUSION
Federal common law has almost universally taken the
place of state real property debtor protections. Talismanic use
of the goals of uniformity and protection of federal revenues has
led the Ninth Circuit analysis away from the traditional bal-
ancing of the preemption doctrine to virtual automatic rejec-
tion of state law. The Ninth Circuit has developed three addi-
tional factors to guide its choice of law decisions. Federal regu-
lations on point will preempt state law. An individually negoti-
ated contract, coupled with a strong state interest or a choice
of law provision in the contract, may outweigh the federal in-
terest and result in application of state law. Under this analy-
sis, state law has been applied in a few instances.
The Ninth Circuit has misapplied the uniformity argu-
ment and guarded the federal fisc too jealously. Weighing the
respective federal and state interests prior to the choice of law
decision may advance important state objectives without hind-
ering federal programs. Such a return to traditional analysis
would steady a bewildered court system while assuring federal
programs continued protection.
Douglas Scott Maynard
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